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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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Russian hands was dismissed by the belief that the Soviets would stay
where they were after the German defeat and that a lasting peace would
be secured on this line thus dividing the two worlds.
The settlement of the Polish question by an agreement with the Russian
annexation of that country, though distasteful to the majority of the
House, was accepted under the pretext of discipline and confidence in
their leader.
*' The English Government/' wrote Thomas Jefferson many years ago.,
" presents the singular phenomenon of a nation^ the individuals of which
are as faithful to their private engagements and duties^ as honourable as
worthy, as those of any nation on earth, and whose government is yet the
most unprincipled at this day known,35
" The word of an Englishman," wrote a leading Polish paper in America,
" has lost the value it has possessed through the ages. And by this fact
Western civilisation has lost one of its greatest assets, for the English word
was a synonym, of truth and faithfulness. Since this word had been broken
in the case of a nation who had sacrificed everything in order to keep its
worcl, it became difficult—even impossible—for that wronged Polish nation
to any longer have an esteem for the British guarantee.
" The United States had withdrawn from their principles^ from the
solemn promises given in the Atlantic Charter to the whole world, while
Britain had torn up her Treaty."
" There was a general sense of bowing to the inevitable ..." wrote
The Tablet on the atmosphere in the two Houses of Parliament on March 1,
" a kind of helplessness, as if the imposition on a Poland of, at the best, the
standardised technical culture of the modern age, calculated to drown
within a few generations all that centuries have made distinctively Polish,
was something inevitable, against which it would be mere sentimentalism
to protest; and as even the imposition of that alien Marxist regime which
the Poles have well-founded reason to fear, would be so largely the result
of irresistible trends that objection would be a quixotic folly."
There was also the apparent conviction in the House that the result
obtained in the Crimea was all that could possibly be obtained in that
hour when the armies of Muscovy were sweeping over the ruins of the
great Fascist Empire.
The Members of Parliament who cast their vote in approval of
Churchill's policy in the Crimea were the same men from whom Chamber-
lain had collected 366 votes (Labour voted 144 against) in support of
his deal at Munich. No Conservative had dared to vote against his handing
over of, as Lloyd George commented,"a little democratic state to a ruthless
dictator who will deny freedom to both Czechs and Germans.3> Among
those who abstained from voting in that crisis had been Churchill and
Eden. This time there was no one with the courage of the late Lloyd
George^who would speak out and similarly denounce the new dictator.
Duff-Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty in Chamberlain's
Government had resigned, as he could not c swallow * the language of
appeasement applied by his Prime Minister to Hitler. In 1945, Harry
Straus., Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Planning, found that